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〈 Abstract 〉
We examine the relationship between credit ratings / changes and audit fees (hours) for Big4 and 
Non-Big4 firms. Audit fee (hours) may be considered as a default risk metric for credit ratings agencies. 
However, firms audited by Big4 are larger, better performing and operate with lower leverage compared 
to firms followed by Non-Big4. Therefore, the association between audit fee (hours) may be different for 
firms followed by Big4 and Non-Big4 audit firms. We find that there is a negative association between 
audit fees and credit ratings for firms followed by Big4 audit firms. However, we find an insignificant 
relation for firms followed by Non-Big4. We conjecture the different association due to the Big4 firms 
having more robust accounting procedures; Big4 firms must offer competitive audit fees because they 
are engaged in fierce competition with other Big4 firms. Moreover, Big4 and Non-Big4 firms have 
different relationships with their clients because Non-Big4 firms are more income dependent on their 
clients.
Using a sample of 1,717 firm–year observations between 2002 and 2013, we establish a relation 
between audit fees in period t and credit ratings in period t+1, for firms followed by Big4 auditors. We 
do not find a significant relation for firms followed by Non-Nig4 firms, suggesting that credit ratings 
agencies perceive audit fee differently for Big4 and Non-Big4 firms. Client firms followed by Big4 auditors 
that experience a credit rating change in period t+1 pay lower audit fees in period t compared to firms 
that do not experience a credit rating change. Our additional analysis suggests a different association 
between firms audit fees and firm performance for firms that experience a credit rating increase and 
decrease. Firms that experience a credit ratings increase in period t+1 have strong performance and 
lower audit fees in period t. On the other hand, firms that experience a credit rating decrease have 
weak financial performance and negative audit fees compared to firms that do not experience a credit 
ratings change. Our results suggest that audit fees combined with financial performance influence a 
credit ratings agency' perception of default risk.
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국제회계연구
제63집, 2015년 10월
한국국제회계학회
감사보수와 감사시간은 신용등급에 영향을 미치는가?:
Big4와 Non-Big4 감사법인 비교를 중심으로
임 형 주* ․ 말리 다피드**
< 국문초록 >
본 연구는 감사보수와 감사시간이 신용등급과 신용등급의 변화에 영향을 미치는지에 대해 검토하는 
것을 목적으로 한다. 선행연구에 따르면 감사인들은 위험수준이 높은 기업들에 더 많은 감사노력을 투
입하여 소송위험과 같은 잠재적 위험을 사전에 차단하려고 노력하는 것으로 알려져 있다(Davis et al. 
1993; Bell et al. 2001; Johnstone and Bedard 2001, 2004). 높은 감사보수와 감사시간은 높은 감사노력
으로 연결되어 높은 감사품질을 견인할 수 있지만, 감사인과 피감사기업의 유착관계 혹은 위험이 높은 
기업에 대한 추가적 감사시간투입으로 인지될 수도 있다. 이는 실증적으로 해결해야 할 문제이며 이에 
관한 연구는 실로 부족한 실정이다. 특히, 우리나라의 경우 수많은 감사인 관련 제도가 입법화 되면서 
Big4 감사인간의 보수 과당경쟁이 심화되었고 이로 인해 근본적인 감사품질의 제고가 필요하다는 우려
의 목소리가 커지고 있다. Big4와 Non-Big4는 감사보수 및 위험에 관한 유인에 체계적인 차이가 있을 
것으로 예상되므로 본 연구는 이 두 그룹을 철저하게 분리하여 분석하는 방법을 채택하였다.
본 연구는 2002년부터 2013년 상장기업 중 회사채를 발행한 1,717 기업-년을 표본으로 선정하고 감
사보수 및 시간이 신용등급에 미치는 영향을 고찰하였다. 연구결과, 감사보수와 당기 신용등급 및 차
기 신용등급과 유의적인 음(-)의 관련성이 Big4표본에서만 관찰되었다. Big4의 경우 감사보수는 과당경
쟁으로 인해 사전에 할인되어 결정되는 경우가 빈번한데 감사보수가 증가한다는 것은 유착관계 등의 
위험 신호로 인지될 가능성이 있다. 그러나 Non-Big4의 경우 지역 고객유치에 치중하는 경향이 강하므
로 상대적으로 과당 보수경쟁으로부터 자유로울수 있고 따라서 감사보수의 증가는 감사품질의 향상으
로 인지될 가능성이 있다. 이는 감사보수의 증가가 Big4와 Non-Big4의 분류에 따라 상이한 신호로 인
지될 수 있는 가능성을 시사하는 결과이다. 한편 감사시간은 신용등급 및 신용등급의 변화와 유의적인 
관련성이 없는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 신용등급평가기관들이 감사시간을 위험신호로 고려하지 않는 것
에 기인할 수도 있고 또 감사품질을 향상시키기 위한 추가적인 감사시간투입과 위험회피성 감사투입
시간 투입의 혼재된 결과일 수도 있다. 본 연구는 Big4와 Non-BIg4 여부에 따라 감사보수와 감사시간
이 신용등급을을 예측할 수 변수로 사용될 때 차이가 있다는 점을 확인했다는 점에서 의의가 있다.
주제어 : 신용등급, 장기 사채, 감사보수, 감사시간, Big4
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I. Introduction
We examine whether a firm’s credit rating level and credit ratings changes are 
associated with auditors assessment of audit risk, consequently audit fees (hours). 
Moreover, we compare a credit ratings agency's perception of risk for firms followed by 
Big4 and Non-Big4 audits. Credit risk is the possibility or expectation of financial default 
(Moody’s Investor Service 2009; Standard and Poor's 2012). Firms with low credit ratings 
have a higher expectation of default compared to firms with higher credit ratings. The 
purpose of an audit is to provide an impartial view about a firms reporting system, 
operations and financial statements, and to reduce audit risk below a given level (Gul 
2006). Therefore, given that monitoring is likely to reduce risk (PCAOB 2007), monitoring 
by audit firms is likely to influence credit ratings.
Previous studies find that credit ratings are calculated using numerous financial and 
non-financial metrics (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006: Kraft, 
2014). Evidences suggest that auditors provide a higher level of audit service to riskier 
clients (Davis et al. 1993; Bell et al. 2001; Johnstone and Bedard 2001, 2004). Thus, firms 
with low-quality ratings signal higher liquidity risk, as a result, these firms are likely to 
increase the likelihood of auditor assessment of risk, hence an increase in audit fee 
(hours). The audit process of Big4 accounting firms are considered to be superior to 
Non-Big4 firms. Therefore, given the relation between risk and the superiority of the 
accounting process of Big4 firms, there is a possibility that audit fees have a different 
relation with credit ratings for firms followed by Big4 and Non-Big4 auditors.
To establish a relation between credit rating and credit rating changes with audit fee 
(hour) for Big4 vs Non-Big4 firms, we perform numerous empirical tests. First, we 
perform a mean difference test to compare the financial statement characteristics of 
firms audited by Big4 and Non-Big4 firms. Our results suggest that firms audited by Big4 
are generally larger, have higher performance proxied by ROA and CPS, pay higher 
audit fees and experience higher levels of audit hours.
Secondly, we test the relationship between credit ratings and audit fees (hours). Using 
ordered probit regression, we find that firms with high credit ratings have lower audit 
fees compared to lower rated firms for our Big4 sample. We do not find a statistically 
significant relationship between audit fee and credit rating for firms followed by 
Non-Big4 firms. Our results are consistent with credit ratings agencies considering the 
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audit quality of Big4 auditors to be superior to the audit quality on Non-Big4 firms. 
Moreover, we postulate, that because of the fierce competition among Big4 firms, Big4 
audit firms have incentives to 'lowball' competing Big4 firms to capture client contracts, 
hence Big4 firms are likely to provide more competitive fees compared to Non-Big4 
firms1). Firms audited by Non-Big4 have a different relationship with clients compared to 
Big4 firms. Thus, we infer that the insignificant association between audit fee and credit 
ratings for Non-Big4 firms could be because Non-Big4 firms are more income dependent 
on clients compared to Big4 firms. 
Thirdly, we use ordered probit regression to establish the relation between credit 
ratings t+1 and audit fees (hours) in period t. We examine the relation between audit 
fees (hours) and credit ratings in period t+1 to establish the possibility that audit fees 
influence a credit rating analysts perception of risk in the following period. We posit 
that a positive relation between audit fees in period t+1 and credit ratings in period t 
would be interpreted by a credit rating agency analyst as a form of collusion between 
an auditor and client firm. We find a negative relation between audit fee in period t 
and credit rating in period t+1 for firms followed by Big4 auditors, suggesting that credit 
ratings agencies consider audit fee as a risk metric related to corporate governance 
when calculating credit ratings in post periods. We do not find a relation between audit 
fees in period t and credit ratings in period t+1 for Non-Big4 firms, suggesting that 
credit ratings agencies perceive audit fees differently for Big4 firms and Non-Big4 firms.
Next, we use logistic regression to establish if firms that experience a credit rating 
increase / decrease have different levels of audit fee (hours) compared to firms that do 
not experience a credit rate change. We find that firms that experience a credit rating 
change have lower audit fees compared to firms that do not experience a credit rating 
change, when followed by Bi4 auditors. The results suggest that audit fee is a metric 
with the potential to signal default risk to auditors. We perform additional tests to 
establish the different association between firms that increase and decrease their credit 
ratings compared to control groups. We find that firms that experience a credit rating 
increase have lower audit fees and show stronger performance compared to firms that 
do not experience a credit rating change. 
1) It is well known that there is a fierce competition amongst audit providers because various 
legislative policies, such as the 'auditor retention rule', 'mandatory audit partner' and 'firm 
rotation policy', have been implemented.
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Moreover, we find that firms that experience a credit rating decrease in period t also 
have negative audit fees in period t+1. However, the results suggest these firms have 
statistically significantly negatively weaker performance compared to sample groups, 
suggesting that audit fees can be considered as a metric with the potential to signal 
default risk for both strong performing and weak performing firms.  
There is limited research establishing a relation between audit fee and credit ratings 
in South Korea. Chun et al. (2014) find a positive association between abnormal audit 
hours and credit ratings, suggesting that credit ratings agencies are more likely to issue 
a higher credit rating to a firm that have experienced more audit hours. Park et al 
(2011) finds a negative (a positive) association between abnormal audit fees and credit 
ratings for public firms (private firms). In South Korea, a the relationship between audit 
fees and credit ratings for Big4 vs Non-Big4 is an empirical question left unanswered. 
Our research is motivated by this caveat.  We contribute to the literature by providing 
evidence that there are fundamental differences in a credit rating agencies interpretation 
of risk for Non-Big4 and Big4 firms. Moreover, we find that credit ratings agencies 
consider an increase in audit fees as a proxy for risk for Big4 firms.
The remained of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide a 
review of relevant literature and develop hypotheses; in Section III, we explain the 
research design and model specification; Section IV presents our results. In Section V we 
perform additional analysis. Section VI concludes.
II. Literature review and Hypotheses development
Standard and Poor's (2012) and Moody’s Investor Service (2009) define credit risk as 
the possibility or expectation of financial default. A credit rating is the current opinion 
of a credit rating agency about a firm's credit worthiness obtained from public and 
private information. As a rule, there are ten credit ratings categories. The highest 
categories in descending order are AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, D; each 
category from AA to CCC is divided into subcategories with  +/-. A firm can experience 
a credit rating increase if credit risk decreases. If a credit ratings agency perceives an 
increase in credit risk, a firm may experience a credit risk decrease. Credit ratings are 
extensively used by bond investors, debt issuers, and governmental officials as a measure 
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of a firm’s default risk. Boot et al. (2006) argue that credit ratings provide an 
‘economically meaningful role’ by facilitating equilibrium in bond investment. Thus, 
firms with a similar credit rating are grouped together as firms of similar quality (Kisgen, 
2006).
The purpose of an audit is to reduce audit risk below a given level (Gul 2006). An 
audit provides assurance to the shareholders and other stakeholders that the financial 
statements are impartial. Whilst audits provide evidence of impartiality, an element of 
audit risk remains. Audit risk is the likelihood of an undetected error in a client's 
reporting systems, operations or financial statements. An auditor evaluates risk based on 
controls related to that environment and the monitoring levels of external monitors such 
as analysts, lenders and credit rating's agencies (PCAOB 2007). Moreover, the monitoring, 
performed by external monitors is explicitly included as one of the controls for risk 
evaluation. Thus, this evaluation of the control environment "can result in increasing or 
decreasing the testing that the auditor would have performed on other controls” 
(PCAOB 2007, para. 23), which likely affects the audit fee. Higher levels of risk result in 
higher levels of effort to detect audit risk about a firm's reporting systems, operations 
or financial statements. Prior studies suggest that auditors provide a higher level of audit 
service to riskier clients, hence an increase in audit fees (Davis et al. 1993; Bell et al. 
2001; Johnstone and Bedard 2001, 2004).
Boot et al. (2006) explains that credit ratings are valuable for two institutional 
features; first, a credit rating agency is a valuable monitor of corporate governance and 
financial reporting; secondly, credit ratings provide relevant information for institutional 
investors. In addition to financial fundamentals, ratings take into account developments in 
management structure and corporate governance quality (Crouchy et al., 2001; Bhojraj 
and Sengupta, 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). When assessing a firm's credit 
worthiness, the ratings analyst considers numerous factors including, industry, and macro 
information. Credit ratings are based on both quantitative and qualitative information. 
Credit ratings agencies have access to a firm’s undisclosed information; therefore, a 
credit rating provides additional information to that already in the public domain. Kraft 
(2014) explains that credit rating agencies base credit ratings on ‘hard’ financial 
statement data, and soft adjustments based on managerial performance, which raises the 
possibility of a higher or lower credit rating based on non-financial data. Thus, firms 
with low-quality ratings signal higher liquidity risk. As a result, high risk firms are likely 
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to increase the likelihood of auditor assessment of audit risk, proxied by audit fee 
(hours). 
In South Korea, there is limited research establishing a relation between audit fee and 
credit ratings(Park, 2012). Kim et al. (2010) analyze the effect of credit fee on credit 
ratings, and find an insignificant relation between audit fee / audit hours and credit 
ratings. Chun et al. (2014) test the effect of abnormal audit hours on credit rating and 
cost of debt. They find a positive association between abnormal audit hours and credit 
ratings, suggesting that credit ratings agencies are more likely to issue a higher credit 
rating to a firm that have experienced more audit hours. The study most closely 
resembling our research is conducted by Park et al. (2011). Their research compares the 
audit fees and credit ratings of public and private firms. They find a negative (a 
positive) association between abnormal audit fees and credit ratings for public firms 
(private firms). They interpret their results as credit rating agencies issuing a lower 
credit ratings for firms with higher audit fees because they are considered to have a 
close relationship with their auditors; therefore, auditor independence may be impaired. 
Our research differs from Park et al. (2011) because we compare the difference 
between the audit fee (hours) of Big4 and Non-Big4. Moreover, we establish an 
association between audit fee and credit rating changes.
Prior studies suggest that auditors provide a higher level of audit service to riskier 
clients, hence an increase in audit fees  (Davis et al., 1993; Bell et al., 2001; Johnstone 
and Bedard, 2001, 2004; Park et al., 2010). South Korea legislators have adopted 
numerous auditing policies since 1982(Han and Moon, 2009). The auditor retention rule 
triggered a fierce competition, and the mandatory audit firm rotation rule brought audit 
fees to it’s minimum level. The ‘low-price’ competition is considered more serious 
among Big4 firms. Therefore, higher audit fee for Big4 firms can be considered by credit 
ratings analyst as a form of collusion, thus higher default risk. Therefore, we may 
interpret a negative relation between audit fee and credit ratings because firms with 
higher credit rating (therefore lower default risk) pay lower audit fee because less effort 
is required to audit their account. Moreover, we expect that firms with higher ratings 
are less likely to be associated with financial misreporting and collusion compared to 
firms with lower credit ratings. Therefore, we expect firms with higher credit ratings to 
have low audit risk and lower audit fees (hours); hence, we expect an inverse relation 
between auditor assessment of audit risk and ratings. Thus, we make the following 
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hypothesis:  
H1: Audit fees/hours have a negative association with credit ratings.
Next, we examine if audit fees (hours) have the possibility to influence a credit rating 
analysts perception of risk. We expect a negative relationship between audit fee (hours) 
in period t and credit ratings in period t+1 because credit rating agencies may consider 
an increase audit fees (hours) as a corporate governance metric with the potential to 
signal increased risk or the possibility of collusion between auditors and clients.  Thus, 
we make the following hypothesis: 
H2: Audit fees/hours negatively influence credit ratings in t+1 period.
Based on our previous hypotheses, we make the assumption that negative audit fees 
are a signal of strong corporate governance; therefore, we estimate a negative relation 
between a credit rating increase and audit fees. However, the relationship between a 
credit rating downgrade and audit fee/hour is more complicated. The market reacts to 
ratings changes, especially downgrades (Ederington et al., 1987; Hull et al., 2004; Norden 
and Weber, 2004). Credit rating agencies’ decision on whether to keep a credit rating 
stable or downgrade credit ratings are based on firm’s financial numbers and corporate 
governance measures as a proxies for risk.  On one hand, credit rating agencies may 
perceive an increase in audit fee (hours) as a signal of collusion or impaired 
independence. As a result, a firm’s accounting numbers can no longer be considered 
reliable. Therefore, a credit ratings agency may be motivated to downgrade a firms 
credit rating. On the other hand, a firm may pay a lower audit fee due to financial 
distress. A firm with weak financial performance may simply not have sufficient funding 
to pay audit fees. Therefore, a negative association between audit fee and credit rating 
in period t+1 for firms with weak financial fundamentals may also imply an increase in 
risk. Thus, we suggest that firms that experience a credit ratings change should have 
different levels of audit fees (hours) compared to firms that do not experience a credit 
rating change. Therefore, we make the following hypothesis:
H3: Audit fees/hours have a relation to credit rating changes.
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Big4 auditors provide higher levels of quality of audit information compared to 
Non-Big4 auditors (DeAngelo 1981; Becker et al., 1998; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Behn 
et al., 2008). Academic literature provides three reasons why Big4 accounting firms have 
higher audit quality compared to Non-Big4. First, the income dependence of Non-Big4 
auditors is higher than Big4, creating incentives for auditors to collude with client firms. 
Second, Big4 audit firms have higher incentives to retain their public image and 
reputation to avoid litigation risk (DeAngelo, 1981; Basu et al., 2001). Third, Big4 auditors 
have better audit systems and professionals. Moreover, after the adoption of the 
mandatory audit rotation rule, there has been fierce competition amongst Big4 audit 
firms. Therefore, we would expect a different relationship between credit ratings and 
risk as proxied by audit fee (hours) for Big4 and Non-Big4 audit firms. 
III. Research Design
3.1 Sample selection
All credit rating data is collected from TS2000 and financial data is collected from FN 
guide. Our sample period is from 2002 to 2013 and all data is collected per fiscal  year. 
Our credit ratings variable is taken from the highest credit rating level for the four 
largest credit ratings agencies in South Korea, National Information & Credit Evaluation 
(NICE), Korea Investor Services (KIS), Korea Ratings (KR) and Seoul Credit Rating & 
Information (SCI). We combine the highest values of all four credit rating agencies to 
increase our sample. Due to the possibility that each of our four samples may provide 
inconsistent credit ratings levels, we conducted a battery of mean-difference tests 
comparing the credit rating of each firm. We find statistically insignificant differences 
between the credit ratings levels of each firm, hence the combination of the highest 
level of credit ratings for each credit rating agency is a homeogenous group. We 
exclude the results for brevity.
Panel A in <Table 1> shows our sample selection process. There are 2,480 firm year 
observations of firms borrowing equity in the form of public debt. We delete 739 post 
period firms, and an additional 24 because no financial data was available. leaving a total 
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of 1,717 observations. Panel B in <Table 1> provides details of our sample’s distribution. 
Credit ratings take an ordinal score from 1 to 17. A value of 17 represents the highest 
credit ratings level, AAA or equivalent (from of KIS, KR, NICE and SCI). Firms with a 
credit rating of AA+ are coded with an ordinal score of 16, firms with AA are given an 
ordinal score of 15, firms with a credit rating of AA- are coded with an ordinal score of 
14.…B- firms receive an ordinal score coding of 2. All firms below CCC+, and below are 
given an ordinal score of 1. We base this approach on Alissa et al. (2013). <Table 1> 
Panel B illustrates a relatively normal distribution. The most common credit ratings are 
A-, followed by A, A+, AA and BBB+ suggesting that the majority of firms straddle the 
investment grade cut-off level.
<Table 1> Audit fee sample selection by credit ratings
Panel A: Audit fee and CR sample from 2002-2013
Initial CR Sample 2,480
Excluding Post periods (739)
Potential Sample 1,741
Excluding firms with no financial data available (24)
Final Sample 1,717
Panel B: Sample selection by credit ratings
CR scores CR Obs CR sores CR Obs
17 AAA 87 8 BBB- 168
16 AA+ 69 7 BB+ 73
15 AA 80 6 BB 73
14 AA- 156 5 BB- 72
13 A+ 158 4 B+ 44
12 A 172 3 B 32
11 A- 193 2 B- 17
10 BBB+ 155 1 Below B- 32
9 BBB 136 Total 1,717
3.2 Model specifications and variables descriptions
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether a firm’s credit rating level and 
credit ratings changes are associated with auditors assessment of audit risk and 
consequently audit fee (hours). Moreover, we test if credit ratings agencies perceive risk 
differently for Big4 audit firms compared to Non-Big4. To examine the relation between 
credit ratings and audit fee, we develop based the following model: 
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          (1)
Where,
CR : Credit Ratings in t period
Audit Fee : Natural logarithm of audit fee
Audit Hrs : Natural logarithm of audit hours
Size : Natural logarithm of total assets
Lev : Total liabilities / Total assets
Grw :    
ROA : Net income / Total assets
CPS : Cashflow from operation / Outstanding shares
ID : Industry fixed effect
YD : Year fixed effect
CR, a firm's credit rating is our dependent variable. CR is an ordinal scale that takes 
on a value of 1 to 17. Audit fee (Audit_Fee), the natural logarithm of audit fee and 
audit hour (Audit_Hour), the natural logarithm of audit hour are our independent 
variables of interest. We expect an inverse relationship between credit rating levels and 
audit fee hours. Firms with lower credit rating level are considered risker compared to 
firms with higher credit ratings. Therefore, we expect  to be negative. 
In equation 2, we examine the relation between audit fee in period t and credit rating 
in period t+1. Our dependent variable, Post_CR is a firm's credit rating in period t+1. 
Our variables of interest, Audit_Fee and Audit_Hour() are described previously. The 
purpose of equation (2) is to establish if audit fees in period t influence a credit ratings 
perception of risk in period t+1. A positive relation between audit fee in period t and 
credit rating in t+1 could be interpreted as collusion between an auditor and a client 
firm. Thus, we expect a negative relation between audit hour hours (fee) in period t and 
credit ratings in period t+1
          
 
(2)
Where,
Post_CR : Credit Ratings in t+1 period
In equation 3, we examine the relation between credit rating changes and audit fee 
(hour). CR_Change is an indicator variable that takes 1 if credit rating changed from t 
- 12 -
to t+1 period, 0 otherwise. We conjecture that the audit fee (hours) in period t for firms 
that experience a credit rating change in period t+1 will be different to firms that do 
not experience a credit rating change. For firms that experience a credit rating increase, 
we expect  to be negative, signalling a reduction in risk.   can be positive or 
negative depending on a firms financial performance. We interpret a positive  and 
strong performance as collusion. We interpret negative  and weak financial 
fundamentals as financial distress. 
          
 
(3)
Where,
CR_Change  : Dummy variable that takes 1 if a credit rating changed from t to t+1 period, 0 
otherwise.
Our control variables are taken from previous studies (Hovakimian et al. 2001, 2009). 
Size, the natural logarithm of total assets is expected to have a positive sign. Lev, Total 
liabilities divided by Total assets is a proxy for default risk. We expect Lev to be 
negative. Grw,     is a proxy for future growth options. Growing firms are 
expected to have less risk; we expect Grw to be positive. ROA, net income divided by 
total assets and CPS, cashflow from operation divided by outstanding shares are proxies 
for firm performance. We expect ROA and CPS to be positive. ID and YD are industry 
fixed effect and Year fixed effect.
VI. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation
Panel A in <Table 2> illustrates the descriptive statistics and the results of our 
mean-difference test comparing the financial fundamentals of firms followed by Big4 and 
Non-big4 firms. All our variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels to 
eliminate the effect of outliers. The credit rating levels, audit fee/hour, size, growth 
level, firm performance and cash flow from operation are statistically significantly lager 
- 13 -
for Big4 firms compared to for Non-Big4 firms at the 1% level. Univariate tests find 
statistically significant differences between the business fundamentals of our two groups: 
firms audited by Big4 and Non-Big4 firms.
Pane B in <Table 2> shows the Pearson Correlations for our sample. Our variables of 
interest are illustrated in column 1. Credit ratings are significantly correlated with our 
variables of interest and control variables. We find a statistically significant positive 
relation between credit rating and larger audit fee/hour. Our results suggest that larger 
firms, with lower risk (lev) and higher performance (ROA and CPS) have higher credit 
ratings. 
<Table 2> Descriptive Statistics, Mean difference test and Pearson Correlation
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics and Mean difference test
(1)  Full Sample (2) Big4 (3)  Non-Big4 Diff test (2)-(3)
Var Mean(Med)
Max
(Min) S.D
Mean
(Med)
Max
(Min) S.D
Mean
(Med)
Max
(Min) S.D t value
CR 10.62(11)
17
(1) 3.82
11.24
(12)
17
(1) 3.65
8.34
(8)
17
(1) 3.59
2.90***
(12.28)
A__Fee 11.84(11.71)
14.50
(9.90) 0.91
12.01
(11.92)
14.73
(10.24) 0.89
11.23
(11.15)
12.63
(9.27) 0.64
0.78***
(14.17)
A_Hrs 7.08(7.23)
10.24
(0.69) 1.65
7.36
(7.46)
10.49
(0.69) 1.52
6.05
(6.58)
8.23
(0.69) 1.68
1.31***
(12.91)
Size 20.64(20.55)
24.29
(17.56) 1.62
20.94
(20.86)
24.71
(17.77) 1.58
19.53
(19.39)
23.32
(17.39) 1.25
1.41***
(14.28)
Lev 0.52(0.53)
0.93
(0.07) 0.18
0.51
(0.53)
0.91
(0.05) 0.18
0.53
(0.55)
0.94
(0.17) 0.18
-0.02*
(-1.84)
Grw 0.08(0.07)
1.16
(-0.72) 0.26
0.08
(0.07)
1.30
(-0.73) 0.27
0.06
(0.06)
0.81
(-0.59) 0.22
0.03*
(1.73)
ROA 0.03(0.03)
0.18
(-0.35) 0.08
0.03
(0.03)
0.20
(-0.28) 0.08
0.01
(0.02)
0.14
(-0.47) 0.09
0.02***
(4.31)
CPS 5.53(1.72)
83.77
(-11.8) 14.0
6.18
(1.99)
92.0
(-12.1) 15.08
3.14
(0.82)
32.31
(-5.53) 8.69
3.04***
(3.35)
Obs 1717 1372 345
Panel B: Pearson Correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. CR 1
2. Audit fee 0.41*** 1
3. Audit hour 0.28*** 0.62*** 1
4. Size 0.54*** 0.83*** 0.53*** 1
5. Lev -0.42*** 0.05** 0.02 0.03 1
6. Grw 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.08*** 0.02 1
7. ROA 0.35*** 0.14*** 0.08*** 0.18*** -0.40*** 0.23*** 1
8. CPS 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.17*** 0.32*** -0.21*** 0.05* 0.19*** 1
Note 1: Variable definitions
CR : Credit Ratings in t period
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Audit Fee : Natural logarithm of audit fee
Audit Hrs : Natural logarithm of audit hours
Size : Natural logarithm of total assets
Lev : Total liabilities / Total assets
Grw :    
ROA : Net income / Total assets
CPS : Cashflow from operation / Outstanding shares
ID : Industry fixed effect
YD : Year fixed effect
Note 2: *, **, *** are significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively
4.2 Multivariate Analysis results
We perform ordered probit regression to test the relation between credit ratings and 
audit fee (hours). <Table 3> illustrates the results of our analysis. We find a negative 
relation between credit ratings and audit fee at the 5% level for our complete sample 
and Big4 auditors. The results suggest that as credit ratings increase, a client firms audit 
fees decrease; consistent with hypothesis 1. Thus, audit fees have a relation with credit 
risk.
 <Table 3> Ordered Probit Regression Analysis (DV: Credit Ratings)
Ordered probit regression Model: 
                      (1)
Sign Full Sample Big4 Non-Big4
Audit Fee ? -0.10**(-1.98)
-0.14**
(-2.36)
-0.03
(-0.23)
Audit Hours ? 0.01(0.28)
-0.00
(-0.07)
-0.02
(-0.66)
Size + 0.47***(15.71)
0.42***
(20.47)
0.44***
(12.78)
0.37***
(16.34)
0.53***
(8.18)
0.53***
(9.80)
Lev - -2.83***(-17.57)
-2.84***
(17.64)
-2.69***
(-15.13)
-2.70***
(-15.19)
-3.69***
(-9.34)
-3.68***
(-9.32)
Grw ? -0.14(-1.47)
-0.14
(-1.36)
-0.18*
(-1.70)
-0.17
(-1.55)
0.03
(0.12)
0.04
(0.15)
ROA + 1.42***(3.97)
1.42***
(3.95)
1.46***
(3.50)
1.42***
(3.40)
0.81
(1.10)
0.77
(1.05)
CPS + 0.01***(3.40)
0.01***
(3.48)
0.01***
(3.17)
0.01***
(3.26)
0.02***
(2.61)
0.02**
(2.53)
ID Included Included Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included
Chi2 1044.42*** 1040.58*** 697.46*** 691.91*** 251.51*** 251.90***
Pseudo R2 0.1138 0.1134 0.0971 0.0963 0.1409 0.1411
Obs 1717 1717 1372 1372 345 345
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Note 1: Variables are defined in descriptive statistics
Note 2: Numbers in parenthesis indicate z statistics
Note 3: *, **, *** are significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively
Audit Fee shows a negative sign for our Non-Big4 sample, but the results are 
statistically insignificant. Firms audited by Big4 auditors, tend to be larger, perform well 
financially, and have lower risk compared to firms audited by Non-Big4 auditors (See 
table 1). Therefore, credit ratings agencies may consider an audit performed by Big4 
auditors as an audit of superior audit quality, especially considering Korea's experiment 
with recent auditing policies. Moreover, because of fierce competition among Big4 firms, 
Big4 audit firms have incentives to 'lowball' competing Big4 firms to capture client 
contracts, hence Big4 firms are likely offer more competitive audit fees to potential 
customers compared to Non-Big4 firms. Moreover, we infer an insignificant association 
between audit fee and credit ratings for Non-Big4 firms because Non-Big4 firms are 
more dependent on clients for income compared to Big4. 
<Table 4> Ordered Probit Regression Analysis (DV: Credit Ratings in t+1 period)
Ordered probit regression Model:
                       (2)
Sign Full Sample Big4 Non-Big4
Audit Fee ? -0.10**(-1.95)
-0.12**
(-2.11)
-0.12
(-1.05)
Audit Hours ? 0.01(0.36)
-0.00
(-0.03)
-0.21
(-0.63)
Size + 0.46***(15.52)
0.41***
(20.17)
0.43***
(12.43)
0.37***
(16.07)
0.54***
(8.37)
0.51***
(9.47)
Lev - -2.86***(-17.71)
-2.87***
(-17.78)
-2.69***
(-15.14)
-2.70***
(-15.19)
-3.98***
(-9.92)
-3.99***
(-9.95)
Grw ? -0.12(-1.19)
-0.11
(-1.08)
-0.15
(-1.33)
-0.13
(-1.19)
-0.05
(-0.20)
-0.04
(-0.17)
ROA + 2.31***(6.36)
2.29***
(6.33)
2.25***
(5.33)
2.22***
(5.24)
2.15***
(2.90)
2.14***
(2.87)
CPS + 0.01***(3.40)
0.01***
(3.48)
0.01***
(3.21)
0.01***
(3.29)
0.02***
(2.55)
0.02**
(2.55)
ID Included Included Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included
Chi2 1098.58*** 1094.90*** 727.24*** 722.80*** 285.16*** 284.47***
Pseudo R2 0.1198 0.1194 0.1015 0.1009 0.1593 0.1590
Obs 1717 1717 1372 1372 345 345
Note 1: Post_CR : Credit Ratings in t+1 period. Other variables are defined in descriptive 
statistics.
Note 2: Numbers in parenthesis indicate z statistics
Note 3: *, **, *** are significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively
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Audit hours do not show a statistically significant relation with credit ratings. In South 
Korea, audit fees are negotiated and fixed at the beginning of the fiscal year. Audit fees 
in South Korea are lower compared to developed countries and fixed regardless of audit 
hours. Thus, auditors have few incentives to invest additional hours into audits. 
Therefore, increased audit hours can be seen as an additional effort to avoid potential 
litigation. Hence, audit hours may not affect credit ratings.
<Table 4> illustrates the results of our ordered probit regression analysis, testing our 
second hypothesis; whether audit fees influence post year credit ratings (t+1 period). 
Alissa (2013) suggests that management decisions, economic conditions, industry trends 
and management errors within period t have the potential to distort long term credit 
rating; therefore, ‘capital structure adjustments may not be timely enough to allow 
firms to move closer to their expected ratings in period t. Therefore, we include a t+1. 
Credit ratings agencies may perceive higher audit fees as a form of collusion between 
auditor and client firm. A lower audit fee can be considered as a proxy for strong 
corporate governance. We find a negative association between audit fees and credit 
ratings in t+1 period for Big4 auditors at the 5% level, suggesting that increased audit 
fees negatively affect credit ratings in the following period. Thus, a negative relation 
between audit fees in period t and credit ratings in period t+1 signals strong internal 
controls and corporate governance. Due to fierce competition in audit contracts among 
Big4 auditors, audit fees are less likely to significantly increase compared to Non-Big4 
firms. Therefore, credit ratings agencies analysts may make decisions based audit fee.
We fail to find a significant association between audit fees and credit ratings in t+1 
period for the Non-Big4 sample, suggesting that audit fees do not influence credit ratings 
in the following period for Non-Big4 client firms. Non-Big4 firms have less competition 
in audit contracts, compared to Big4, since their clients often tend to be local clients. 
Credit rating agencies may consider the relationship between Non-Big4 and their clients 
to be different to the relationship between Big4 audit firms and their clients. Hence 
credit ratings agencies may not perceive an audit fee as a metric with the potential to 
proxy risk for Non-Big4 client firms. Audit hours have an insignificant association with 
credit ratings in t+1 period for all samples. As discussed above, credit rating agencies 
may see an increased audit horus as additional work to avoid litigation risks. 
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<Table 5> Logistic Regression Analysis (DV: Change)
Logistic Regression Model:
                       
                                                                                      (3)
Variables Sign Full Sample Big4 Non-Big4
Audit Fee - -0.27***(-2.53)
-0.27**
(-2.17)
-0.49
(-1.60)
Audit Hrs - -0.05(-1.34)
-0.06
(-1.28)
-0.08
(-1.04)
Size + 0.27***(4.17)
0.16***
(3.81)
0.24***
(3.34)
0.15***
(3.00)
0.32**
(2.28)
0.19*
(1.67*
Lev - 0.78**(2.21)
0.73**
(2.09)
0.76**
(2.00)
0.72*
(1.89)
1.00
(1.11)
0.93
(1.03)
Grw ? -0.35(-1.50)
-0.33
(-1.42)
-0.37
(-1.47)
-0.35
(-1.40)
-0.21
(-0.32)
-0.18
(-0.27)
ROA + 0.55(0.68)
0.48
(0.60)
0.72
(0.77)
0.63
(0.68)
-0.03
(-0.02)
-0.08
(-0.05)
CPS + -0.01(-1.34)
-0.01
(-1.30)
-0.01
(-1.17)
-0.01
(-1.12)
-0.02
(-0.80)
-0.02
(-0.74)
ID Included Included Included Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included
Chi2 28.85*** 24.23*** 19.76*** 16.68** 17.48** 4.97
Pseudo R2 0.0147 0.0124 0.0124 0.0104 0.0211 0.0141
Obs 1717 1717 1372 1372 345 345
Note 1: Variable definitions
CR_Change: Indicator variable that takes 1 if credit rating changed from t to t+1 period, 0 
otherwise, Other variables are defined in descriptive statistics.
Note 2: *, **, *** are significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively
<Table 5> illustrates the results of our logistic regression analysis, testing our third 
hypothesis, whether audit fees influence credit rating changes (upgrades or downgrades). 
In this model CR_Change is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if credit 
rating changed from t to t+1 period, 0 otherwise. We find a significantly negative 
association between audit fees and credit rating changes for the Big4 and full samples. 
We do not find a statistically significant relation between credit ratings and audit fee, 
consistent with our pervious tests. Our results suggest that firms that experienced a 
credit rating change in period +1 have a lower audit fees in period t compared to firms 
that did not experience a credit rating change in period t+1; if a firm is audited by a 
Big4 firm. Consistent with previous results, audit hours are not related with credit rating 
changes.
- 18 -
V. Additional Analysis
Credit rating changes in <Table 5> include positive changes and negative changes. We 
further partition our sample into 3 sub-samples: 1) positive change, 2) negative change, 3) 
to provide further evidence to support our initial hypothesis, that the audit fees influence a 
credit ratings analyst’s perception of risk. We hypothesize that firms that experience a 
credit ratings increase have strong corporate governance, therefore, we can expect a 
negative relation between audit fee in period t and credit rating in period t+1. Firms that 
experience a credit rating decrease in period t+1, are expected to have different audit fees 
in period t compared to firms that do not  experience a credit ratings change. A positive 
sign would suggest collusion between credit auditor and client firm, hence a lack of 
independence. On the other hand, weak financial fundamentals and for audit fee (hour) 
would suggest that firms that firms cannot pay for auditor services. Therefore, it is possible 
that credit ratings agencies perceive either of these signals as a signal of an increase in 
default risk, depending on financial performance.
<Table 6> shows our results. In Panel A, we perform Logistic regression comparing 
positive changes with negative credit ratings change. In Panel A, CR_Change is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 if a credit rating increased from t to t+1 period, 0 if value 
decreases. Our results in Panel A suggest an insignificant difference between the audit fees 
(hours) for firms that experience a credit increase/decrease. 
In Panel B, we compare the relation between audit fee (hours) and the post period credit 
ratings for firms that experience a positive credit rating change and firms that do not 
experience a credit rating change. In Panel B, CR_Change is an indicator variable that takes 
on the value of 1 if a credit rating increases from t to t+1 period, 0 if the credit rating 
remains unchanged. CR_Change  is statistically significant at the 10% level for our Big4 
sample. The results suggest that firms that experience a positive credit rating change in 
period t+1 are more likely to have lower audit fees that firms that do not experience a 
credit rating change, suggesting a link between audit fees and risk. In Panel C, we compare 
the relation between audit fee (hours) and the post period credit ratings of firms that 
experience a negative credit rating change and firms that do not experience a credit rating 
change. CR_Change, is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if credit ratings 
decrease from t to t+1 period, 0 if a credit ratings have not changed. We find a negative 
association between audit fee and negative credit ratings for our Big4, and  full sample. 
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<Table 6> Additional Logistic Regression Analysis (DV: CR Change)
Panel A: Logistic regression on Positive Change vs Negative Change : 
                     
Sign Full Sample Big4 Non-Big4
Audit Fee ? 0.08(0.37) 0.19(0.83) -1.43(-1.58)
Audit Hours ? -0.05(-0.63) -0.02(-0.23) -0.27(-1.27)
Size + -0.00(-0.02) 0.07(0.76) -0.11(-0.74) 0.00(0.00) 0.62(1.55) 0.18(0.73)
Lev - -0.79(-0.97) -0.85(-1.04) -0.26(-0.29) -0.28(-0.33) -5.21(-1.98)** -4.22(-1.69)*
Grw ? 0.55(1.02) 0.57(1.05) 0.29(0.50) 0.31(0.52) 2.09(1.45) 1.96(1.46)
ROA + 9.10(3.92)*** 8.93(3.88)*** 9.98(3.69)*** 9.88(3.69)*** 4.46(0.94) 4.00(0.88)
CPS + 0.00(0.34) 0.00(0.29) 0.00(0.36) 0.00(0.29) -0.02(-0.26) 0.01(0.21)
Chi2 49.03*** 49.31*** 33.46*** 32.84*** 19.74*** 17.82***
Pseudo R2 0.0920 0.0925 0.0776 0.0762 0.2033 0.1835
Obs 441 441 369 369 72 72
Panel B: Logistic  regression on Positive Change vs No Change  
                     
Audit Fee ? -0.25(-1.97)** -0.23(-1.79)* -0.53(-1.59)
Audit Hours ? -0.06(-1.35) -0.06(-1.29) -0.10(-1.11)
Size + 0.26(3.49)*** 0.17(3.53)*** 0.22(2.58)** 0.14(2.61)*** 0.34(2.06)** 0.22(1.54)
Lev - 0.56(1.43) 0.52(1.32) 0.66(1.54) 0.61(1.43) 0.21(0.19) 0.13(0.12)
Grw ? -0.14(-0.53) -0.12(-0.46) -0.20(-0.73) -0.18(-0.67) 0.26(0.34) 0.33(0.42)
ROA + 0.34(3.10)*** 3.36(3.04)*** 3.26(2.71)*** 3.18(2.65)*** 3.61(1.20) 3.60(1.17)
CPS + -0.01(-1.09) -0.01(-1.03) -0.00(-0.88) -0.00(-0.81) -0.02(-0.63) -0.01(-0.62)
Chi2 30.23*** 28.17*** 18.22*** 17.31*** 8.31 6.45
Pseudo R2 0.0192 0.0179 0.0139 0.0132 0.0331 0.0257
Obs 1588 1588 1272 1272 316 316
Panel C : Logistic  regression on Negative Change vs No Change : 
                     
Audit Fee ? -0.35(-2.01)** -0.38(-1.90)* -0.33(-0.83)
Audit Hours ? -0.03(-0.44) -0.03(-0.36) -0.03(-0.25)
Size + 0.27(2.74)*** 0.13(1.84)* 0.30(2.59)*** 0.14(1.73)* 0.19(0.98) 0.10(0.62)
Lev - 1.39(2.39)** 1.35(2.30)** 1.19(1.85)* 1.15(1.77)* 2.21(-1.59) 2.13(1.51)
Grw ? -0.73(-1.80)* -0.69(-1.71)* -0.69(-1.58) -0.64(-1.45) -0.95(-0.91) -0.95(-0.90)
ROA + -2.57(-2.44)** -2.60(-2.49)** -2.93(-2.34)** -3.01(-2.43)** -1.08(-0.50) -1.09(-0.51)
CPS + -0.01(-1.28) -0.01(-1.31) -0.01(-1.13) -0.01(-1.16) -0.04(-0.85) -0.03(-0.79)
Chi2 39.11*** 35.42*** 28.73*** 25.36*** 11.63* 11.02*
Pseudo R2 0.0454 0.0411 0.0428 0.0378 0.0609 0.0577
Obs 1405 1405 1103 1103 302 302
ID & YD for All Models Included Included Included Included Included Included
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Note 1: Variable definitions
CR_Change for Panel A: Indicator variable that takes 1 if credit rating increased from t to t+1 
period, 0 if decreased.
CR_Change for Panel B: Indicator variable that takes 1 if credit rating increased from t to t+1 
period, 0 if credit rating unchanged
CR_Change for Panel C: Indicator variable that takes 1 if credit rating decreased from t to t+1 
period, 0 if credit rating unchanged
Other variables are defined in descriptive statistics.
Note 2: *, **, *** are significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively
 
We interpret the negative relation between audit fee in period t and credit rating 
change in period t+1 differently in Panel B and Panel C. In panel B, our independent 
variable ROA shows the correct positive sign, suggesting that firms with strong 
performance generally have lower audit fees. In Panel C, 3 out of 4 of out our 
independent variables of interest show a statistically significantly signs of financial 
distress. Firms that experience a negative credit rating change have poor financial 
performance (ROA -2.57), negative growth (GRW -0.73) and higher levels of leverage 
(LEV 1.39) comparative to firms that do not experience a credit rating change.  
Therefore, whilst we find a statistically negative relation between audit fee and negative 
credit rating changes in our main analysis. Additional tests find that there is a different 
association between a firm’s audit fees, credit rating changes and firm performance for 
firms that experience a credit rating increase and decrease. A lower audit fee for firms 
with strong fundamentals suggests strong corporate governance when followed by Big4 
firms. A lower audit fee for firms with weak fundamentals is a signal of increased risk 
when a firm is followed by a Big4 auditor. Weak performing firms may simply not be 
able to purchase auditing services, or auditors may simply have to ask for lower fees 
due to the financial constraints of the company.
VI. Conclusions
We examine the relationship between credit ratings / changes and audit fees (hours) 
for Big4 and Non-Big4 firms. We find a negative association between audit fees and 
credit ratings in t period for Big4 firms. However, we do not find a statistically 
significant relation between credit ratings and audit fees for Non-Big4 firms. We 
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conjecture that credit ratings analysts consider the relationship between Big4 firms and 
their clients to be different to the relationship between Non-Big4 firms and their clients. 
Moreover, Big4 firms face fierce competition with other Big4 audit firms. As a result, 
Big4 firms must offer competitive prices to compete with other Big4 firms, hence offer 
lower audit fees. Moreover, Non-Big4 firms are more income dependent relation with 
client firms. Therefore, audit fees may not be considered as a meaningful proxy for risk 
for Non-Big4 firms’ clients. In addition, the auditing procedures of Bi4 firms are 
considered superior to Non-Big4, therefore audit fee may only be considered as an 
additional risk metric for Big4 firms. Moreover, since the adoption of the mandatory 
audit firm rotation policy, the competition between Big4 firms have increased. 
Credit rating agencies may perceive an increase in audit fees as a signal of collusion 
between auditors and client firms. We find that Credit ratings agencies perceive audit 
fees as a corporate governance metric with the potential to capture default risk for 
firms followed by Big-4 auditors, but not Non-Big4 auditors. We find a negative 
association between audit fees and credit ratings in t+1 period for Big4 firms; However, 
we find insignificant a relation between credit audit fees in period t, and credit ratings 
in period t+1 for Non-Big4 firms. Therefore, credit ratings agencies are likely perceive 
audit fee differently for Non-Big4 firms and Big4 firms.   
Our results suggest that audit fees in period t influence credit ratings in period t+1. 
However, auditors may interpret the association between audit fee and financial 
fundamentals differently for firms that experience a credit rating increase and credit 
rating decrease. Firms that experience a credit rating increase have lower audit fees and 
are better performing compared to firms that do not experience a credit ratings; auditors 
can interpret this relationship as a proxy for strong corporate governance. Firms that 
experience a negative credit rating change in period t+1 also have lower audit fees in 
period t+1 compared to firms that do not experience a credit rating change. However, 
the financial performance measures of these firms are much weaker compared to firms 
that do not experience a credit rating change, suggesting that a decrease in audit fee 
and weak performance can be a signal of increased default risk for firms audited by 
Big4 firms. 
A weakness of our paper is that our results based on a Korean context may not be 
applicable other countries because the financial, legal and legislative systems may be 
different. Possible future research may examine the relationship audit fees and credit 
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ratings / credit rating changes in an international context. A possible example is a 
comparative study between the association between audit fee and credit ratings in the 
U.S. / U.K.  compared to South Korea.
"본 논문은 다른 학술지 또는 간행물에 게재되었거나 게재 신청되지 않았음을 확인함“
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